





















































































































































































































































































































































































A central debate within new growth theory is centered around the role of the “ideas”
sector in sustaining equilibrium productivity growth.  In Romer’s seminal model of endogenous
technological change, productivity growth is driven by a constant allocation of resources to an
ideas-producing sector (Romer, 1990), a result which depends critically on strong positive
intertemporal spillovers in ideas production.  Specifically, to generate ideas-driven growth, ideas
sector productivity must increase proportionally with the stock of ideas already discovered.
The significance of ideas–driven growth therefore depends on whether the production
function for ideas satisfies this critical property.   To evaluate this claim, several authors have
examined the relationship between the TFP growth rate and the size of the workforce devoted to
the production of ideas (Jones, 1995; Coe and Helpman, 1995).  The Romer model predicts that
expansion in the number of ideas workers leads to a permanent increase in the TFP growth rate.
In contrast, the empirical evidence suggests that most OECD economies have increased the size
of their R&D workforce while experiencing (at best) constant TFP growth rates.  This weak
relationship between the size of the ideas workforce and the TFP growth rate has led some to
question the viability of ideas-driven growth for the long run (Jones, 1999).
1
This paper contributes to the empirical understanding of economic growth by estimating
the shape of the ideas production function and the strength of the intertemporal and international
spillovers in ideas.  We examine the time-series pattern of international patenting (patents
granted in the United States to inventors from other OECD countries) to evaluate the
determinants of the flow of “new-to-the-world” ideas directly.
2  By using a panel dataset of
patents, we achieve several goals which cannot be addressed in the TFP growth rate literature.
First, by examining patenting (an observable manifestation of ideas production), we can separate
                                                          
1 Several authors instead argue that productivity growth rates can be explained by factor accumulation (as first
suggested in Solow (1956)) including the accumulation of human capital (Barro, 1991; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil,
1992).   Jones’ synthesis model incorporates these insights and includes an ideas sector with weaker intertemporal
spillovers, and whose predictions and empirical motivation are similar to factor accumulation theories (Jones, 1995).
2 In its use of  international patenting data to evaluate specific theories of economic growth,  this paper builds on
Eaton and Kortum (1996; 1998).  However, we are able to substantially extend these prior analyses by exploiting the
panel nature of the data and so go beyond the “snapshot” methodology employed in this prior work.4
ideas production from the more general relationship between the ideas sector and overall
productivity growth.  Accordingly, we distinguish the properties of the ideas production function
from the sensitivity of TFP growth to ideas production.  Second, by exploiting the accumulation
of patents over time, we can explicitly estimate the strength of the spillover from ideas-to-ideas.
In other words, we assess the strength of the linkage between patenting in the past and current
ideas sector productivity.  Finally,  by evaluating patenting patterns using a panel dataset of
OECD countries, we contribute to an emerging literature on the differences between domestic
and international knowledge spillovers (Porter, 1990; Nelson, 1993; Coe and Helpman, 1995;
Park, 1995; Eaton and Kortum, 1998).  Specifically, we differentiate the shape of the national
ideas production function (which includes country-specific spillovers) from the more general
world ideas production function.
Our analysis employs a parameterized version of the ideas production function,
 AH A tA t t = δ
λ φ , where A is a measure of the total stock of knowledge/ideas and HA is the quantity
of human capital devoted to the ideas-producing sector.  The relationship between the stock of
ideas, A, and the flow,  At, represents the key intertemporal spillover – the relationship between
ideas productivity today and the number of ideas discovered in the past.  As a result, the
empirical debate centers around the value of φ  and the relevant measure of A, the stock of
knowledge upon which current ideas productivity draws. Romer (1990) assumes strong positive
spillovers (setting φ  = 1) and that all actors at a given point in time draw upon the same stock of
knowledge.  Under these assumptions, a given percentage increase in the stock of ideas in a
national economy results in a proportional increase in the productivity of the ideas-producing






Our analysis amends the Romer ideas production function in two important ways.  First,
following Jones (1995), we allow for concavity in ideas production (0 < φ  < 1, 0 < λ  < 1).
3
Second, we differentiate the stock of domestic knowledge from the world knowledge pool.  In
                                                          
3 The principal consequences of such concavity is that a constant growth rate for ideas depends on constant growth
in the resources devoted to ideas production so that policies which induce an increase in ideas production will shift5
evaluating the drivers of ideas sector productivity, we allow for separate contributions from the
country-specific and rest-of-world knowledge stocks, respectively.   By separately considering
multiple knowledge sources for each country’s national ideas production function,  we evaluate
the relative importance played by international versus domestic knowledge spillovers in fostering
the production of new ideas.
4
We explore the properties of the national ideas production function by examining the
determinants of the flow of international patents.  For each of the 16 OECD countries in our
dataset, we define an “international” patent to be a patent granted by the U.S. patent office to
foreign establishments.  We exploit variation in the rate of international patenting – a (mostly)
comparable measure of the flow of commercially relevant ideas across time and countries – to
identify the key parameters of the ideas production function.
5  Of course, this measure is a subset
of the total flow of new ideas produced by an economy in a given year, as it excludes those ideas
which are (a) novel to a country but have been already discovered elsewhere and (b) those ideas
which are not worthwhile patenting internationally.  To overcome these two potential sources of
measurement bias, we derive the expected flow of international patents (i.e., valuable “new-to-
the-world” technologies) from the more primitive national ideas production function.
Specifically, we propose a structural model of international patenting which depends on a year-
specific effect, a country-specific effect, and the national ideas production function.
6  In other
words, we are able to test for key parametric restrictions in ideas-based growth by taking
advantage of the differences across advanced economies in their knowledge stocks and their
allocation of resources to invention.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the level of productivity but will have no long-term impact on the growth rate.
4 We also consider extensions involving “intermediate” spillover regimes (e.g., specific geographic regions,
countries with a common language base, or spillovers proportional to trading shares.)
5 The use of patent data to evaluate spillovers and economic growth goes back at least to Schmookler (1963).  Over
the last decade (beginning with the work in Griliches (1984)), there has been increased attention to both the potential
uses (and misuses) of this type of data, both in the domestic and international context (Jaffe, 1986; Griliches, 1990;
Trajtenberg, 1990; Dosi, Pavitt and Soete, 1990).
6 This derived relationship is in the spirit of Eaton and Kortum (1996, 1998) and Jones (1998a).  However, Eaton
and Kortum focus on patenting and technology transfer while Jones focuses on the world ideas production function.6
With this theoretical structure in mind, we employ two distinct estimation strategies.  In
the first, hereafter referred to as the direct approach, we exploit the time-series nature of our data









), where A jt is the sum of international patents
granted to country j up until year t.
7  We then use this measure to evaluate the sensitivity of the
flow of international patenting to the stock.  In the second approach, referred to as the inversion
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aggregate output and factor inputs for the unmeasured ideas stock.  The key difference between
the direct and inversion approaches is in the measurement of the knowledge stock that each
country draws upon in discovering new ideas.  Finally, rather than imposing complicated cross-
equation restrictions, our empirical methodology seeks to let the data speak for itself as much as
possible.  We employ relatively simple regressions and the empirical argument proceeds from
the simplest procedure to more sophisticated treatments, highlighting the main robust empirical
relationships.
We provide evidence for three main findings.  First, there is compelling empirical
evidence that the crucial parametric restriction of the Romer model, φ  = 1, operates at the
country level.  Whether the ideas stock is calculated under the direct or the inversion approaches,
patenting productivity is proportional (or nearly proportional) to our estimate of the domestic
knowledge stock.  Second, we find a negative relationship between domestic R&D productivity
and various measures of the world knowledge stock.  Ideas production by other countries raises
the bar for producing new-to-the-world technology domestically, and this effect outweighs the
positive effects of international knowledge spillovers.  While cross-border knowledge spillovers
are stronger for groups of countries which share a common language base or are geographically
proximate to each other, their strength is small compared to the relationship found between the
domestic knowledge stock and current patenting productivity.   Our third finding results from our
attempt to reconcile these first two findings with the poor performance of the Romer model in
                                                          
7 Adams (1990) provides a useful discussion of the issues involved in constructing stocks of scientific and
engineering knowledge.7
explaining aggregate productivity growth.  We explore how TFP is affected by changes in the
domestic and international stock of patents and find a small and positive effect (i.e., a doubling
of the patent stock is predicted to have only a 10% increase on the level of TFP).    This suggests
that while endogenous growth may be feasible, the size of the ideas-driven growth effects may
be quite modest.  Concavity in the returns to additional researchers and the modest relationship
between increments to the measured stock of ideas and overall productivity growth dampen the
size of endogenous growth effects.
These findings suggest that while R&D workers may “stand on the shoulders” of prior
(domestic) research, these technical achievements have had only a limited impact on measured
aggregate productivity.  Indeed, there seems to be a gap between the increasing level of
resources devoted to R&D and the ability of advanced economies to translate these new
technologies into higher TFP.  Our evidence suggests that, relative to modern ideas-driven
growth models, there is a weaker (but still positive) link between ideas production and realized
productivity growth.  Identifying the factors which enhance this linkage is a promising area for
further research.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II, we review the
parameterization and functional form of the ideas production function, focusing on the elements
which distinguish competing models of the process of economic growth.  In Section III, we
extend the underlying model to incorporate national ideas production in an international context.
In Sections IV and V, we turn to the development of an empirical model based on the use of
international patenting data; to do so, we derive the relationship between national ideas
production and the production of “new-to-the-world” technologies and describe how we measure
the knowledge stock of each country.  After a short description of the data (Section VI), the
principal empirical results are reviewed in Section VII.  Section VIII is devoted to reconciling
the evidence on patenting with data on TFP.  A final section concludes.
II. Parameterizing the Ideas Production Function
Recent models of technology-driven growth extend the neoclassical growth model by
endogenizing the rate of technological progress (  A) through the introduction an ideas sector for8
the economy with an associated production function,  
, AH A tA t t = δ
λφ .
8  According to this
production structure, the rate of new ideas production is simply a function of the number of ideas
workers (HA) and the stock of ideas available to these researchers ( At).   This function makes
the rate of technological change endogenous in two distinct ways.   First, the share of the
economy devoted to the ideas sector is a function of the R&D labor market; allocation to the
ideas sector depends on R&D productivity and the private economic return to new ideas. Second,
the productivity of new ideas production is sensitive to the stock of ideas discovered in the past.
The sign and size of this intertemporal externality is the critical issue for the feasibility of long-
term ideas-based growth.
9  When φ  > 0, prior research increases current R&D productivity (the
so-called “standing on shoulders” effect);  when φ  < 0, prior research has discovered the ideas
which are easiest to find, making new ideas discovery more difficult (the “fishing out”
hypothesis).
The magnitude of φ  is crucial to the debate about whether equilibrium ideas-driven
growth is feasible.  To see this, consider the differences between the initial specification
suggested by Romer (1990) and the synthesis model proposed by Jones (1995).
10  In the Romer
model, φ  = λ  =1.  This implies that a given percentage increase in the stock of ideas results in a
proportional increase in the productivity of the ideas-producing sector.  Under this assumption,
                                                          
8 This specific structure was pioneered in Romer (1990) and is employed (though occasionally in modified form) in
several modern growth models (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Jones 1995; Eaton and Kortum, 1998; and Jones
(1998) for an introduction).
9 We therefore are focusing on the second aspect of endogeneity in the ideas production framework (sufficient
positive feedbacks to ideas production itself).  The empirical analysis does not address directly the viability of
preserving economic incentives for ideas production except insofar as we separately evaluate the salience of ideas
production for generating TFP growth (see Section VIII).  However, given that the ideas sector in many country is
subject to large public subsidies and that it is difficult to measure the contribution of new technologies to TFP, we
believe that evaluating the viability of preserving innovation incentives over the long run awaits further research.
10 While we focus on the specifics of these two alternatives, each reflects a distinct stream of research which offers
dramatically different assessments of the sources of long-term economic growth.   Jones, in particular, proposes a
model consistent with the capital investment oriented interpretations of economic growth proposed by, among
others, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Barro (1991).  In contrast, Romer emphasizes the endogenous
production of  economically useful new knowledge rather than simple capital accumulation.9




HA = δ ), ensuring a positive growth rate even in the absence of population growth.  Under
the Romer restrictions, policies which permanently shift the level of HA have permanent effects
on the growth rate.
Jones questions the empirical relevance of this functional form and suggests that the
strength of intertemporal spillovers may be less than proportional (φ  < 1) and there may be
concavity in the returns to research effort at a point in time (λ < 1).  Under this logic, the constant








φ 1 ;  taking logs and the time derivative, the ideas growth rate is a













.   In other
words, when ideas spillovers are weaker than assumed by Romer, the steady-state growth rate in
ideas will be zero in the absence of a sustained rate of increase in the size of the labor force
devoted to ideas production (see Jones, 1999, for further exposition on this point).
The relationship between these two functional forms can be understood in terms of their
implications for transition dynamics.  Consider a small shift in the size of the workforce devoted
to ideas production.  For values of λ  and φ  approaching one, a large increase in the level of ideas
productivity would result (according to 
λ
φ 1−
); achieving this uptick in productivity would result
from a long period of transition dynamics in which the economy would mimic the behavior of
the Romer model.  In other words, while steady-state predictions of the model are starkly
different,  the models behave quite similarly in the “medium term” as φ  approaches one.
It is important to note that, in either model, equilibrium aggregate productivity growth
depends on the rate of growth in ideas.  In particular, both models share an aggregate production
function, YA K L it it it it =
− σ α α 1 , which depends directly on the growth in the stock of ideas.
11  A
separate empirical issue arises about the relationship between ideas production and aggregate
                                                          
11 For expositional purposes, we abstract away from the intermediate goods sector emphasized in the Romer model
and impose the Solow production function (Solow, 1956, 1957).  Replacing the capital stock with the output of the10
productivity growth.   Models of endogenous technological change do not distinguish explicitly
between φ , the return of ideas-to-ideas, and σ , the return of output-to-ideas.  These parameters
need not be the same: a high value of φ  can coexist with a low value of σ .   Moreover,
endogenous ideas-driven growth requires only that φ  be equal to one (yielding 
 A
A
HA = δ ).
Realized productivity growth, in contrast, is a function of all of the parameters of both the ideas




λ ).  While the feasibility of endogenous growth
depends only on φ  = 1, its empirical relevance depends on the degree of concavity of ideas
production in ideas workers and in the sensitivity of output growth to ideas growth.
12
III. The National Ideas Production Function in an International Context
The ideas production function can be enriched by distinguishing between the domestic
and international stock of ideas.  Most earlier research which has attempted to derive the
implications of growth theory for international data has focused on how the stock of ideas (or
technology) in one country influences productivity growth in other countries through imitation
and trade.
13  Our more narrow  emphasis is on how the stock of international ideas impacts
                                                                                                                                                                                          
intermediate goods sector has no impact on our main conclusions.
12 As well, equilibrium ideas-driven growth depends on preserving the incentives for innovation.  Under the Romer
restriction, these incentives are preserved to the extent that the marginal productivity of the ideas sector increases
proportionally with TFP (and ideas producers are assumed to be able to extract the marginal product of their ideas).
To the extent that φ  < 1, the MRP of the ideas sector must decline over time.  When φ  = 1 but σ  < 1, the viability of
the ideas sector depends either on public subsidies for knowledge production or increases over time in the level of
rent extraction by the ideas sector.  While both of these policies may not be viable for the very long-run (see Jones
(1999), both are relevant concerns in understanding patterns of R&D employment and investment in advanced
economies over the past century (Romer, 1990; Nelson, 1993; Stern, Furman and Porter, 1999).
13 Indeed, the implications of international knowledge spillovers has been an active area of both theoretical and
empirical research within growth theory (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Rivera-Batiz and Romer , 1991; Coe and
Helpman, 1995; Eaton and Kortum, 1996, 1998; Keller, 1997).  This literature emphasizes that ideas produced
abroad contribute to aggregate productivity through licensing, imitation, and the supply of intermediate capital
goods (Romer, 1996).   A principal contention of this literature is that under equal factor prices, and as a
consequence of  knowledge spillovers, the growth rate of laggards will be higher than leading nations until
convergence is achieved (Abromowitz, 1986; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992).11
domestic ideas production.  The main reason for this narrow focus is that we are attempting to
disentangle the specific properties of ideas production from the more general relationship
between ideas production and overall productivity growth.
Our proposed functional form incorporates both domestic and international sources of
knowledge.  Consider the national ideas production function for country j,

, AH A A jt A j j = − δ
λ φ ψ (1)
where Aj is the stock of ideas native to country j, and A-j is the stock of ideas which have been
discovered elsewhere but have not yet diffused into country j.  As the flow of “new-to-the-
country” ideas,  
, A jt may include ideas which have been discovered and utilized elsewhere in the
world but not yet used in country j.  In this sense, a positive value of ψ  captures the possibility of
international imitation -- creating new-to-the-country technologies is easier as the foreign stock
of ideas increases.
14   This functional form draws upon a microeconomic literature which
emphasizes the potential for  complementarity between domestic and international knowledge
(Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1998): ψ  determines the strength of the complementarity between the
foreign and domestic ideas stock.
15
IV.  A Structural Model of International Patenting
In this section, we derive the link between the national ideas production function and the
production of international patents (i.e., patents granted in the United States to foreign
inventors).   In so doing, we develop a specific econometric model which we will use to estimate
the parameters of (1).  Several distinct issues arise:  (a) the relationship between the production
of new-to-the-country and new-to-the-world ideas; (b) concavity in global ideas production; (c)
variation across countries in terms of their propensity-to-patent; (d) the lag between invention
and patent granting; and (e) identifying the parameters of the national ideas production function.
The remainder of this section derives an empirical model which accounts for each of these
                                                          
14 However, diffusion is not free -- acquiring ideas from abroad requires resources (HA) and sophistication (Aj).
15 Of course, alternative formulations could be explored (e.g., the CES (  () ,
//
AH A A jt A j j =+ − δ
λφ
ρφ ρφ
.   Preliminary
empirical research in this direction suggests that, while computationally more complex, our qualitative results are
robust to the CES specification.12
issues.
For a country at a point in time, only a subset of the ideas contributing to its own
economic growth will also be globally novel (the requirement for international patent
protection).   In other words, (1) represents the production of new-to-the-country ideas, not new-
to-the-world ideas.  These two concepts can be linked by making assumptions about how ideas
differ in terms of their novelty.  While some ideas are relatively “close” to the current knowledge
frontier, others are more advanced.  Our empirical work depends on two concrete assumptions.
First, we assume that ideas which are new-to-the-country but not new-to-the-world are drawn
from the portion of the novelty distribution which is “closest” to the current domestic frontier.
Second, we assume that the novelty of ideas follows a Pareto distribution; letting z note the













where τ  is a constant which determines the lower-range of the ideas distribution and β
determines the slope of the ideas distribution (see Figure 1).   While stylized, the Pareto
distribution captures an important feature of the distribution of novelty, namely that the density
of novelty is decreasing in the distance from the current frontier.
16  Under these assumptions, the
flow of new-to-the-world ideas,  
,
* Ajt, is the proportion of the total ideas flow which exceeds the
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Equation (3) suggests that the stock of ideas discovered in the world but not yet discovered in an
individual country plays two distinct roles in the flow of new-to-the-world ideas.  On the one
hand, ideas productivity benefits from cross-border knowledge spillovers (ψ ); on the other hand,
there is a “raising the bar” effect determined by the number of ideas which are new-to-the-
                                                          
16 Kortum (1997), Eaton and Kortum (1998), and Bental and Peled (1996) all use the Pareto distribution to
characterize the R&D novelty distribution.  As discussed in Kortum (1997), a key advantage of the Pareto
distribution is that the distribution function for new inventions does not depend on the current state of knowledge.13
country but not new-to-the-world.
In addition, we account for potential concavity in ideas production at the global level.  In
a given year, (3) describes the “pool” of new-to-the-world ideas produced by a country inclusive
of those ideas which have been duplicated contemporaneously elsewhere in the world.
International patenting patterns, however, will be net of such duplication.  In other words, the
global ideas production function may be concave in the ideas flow of individual countries:
*







 ∑  (4)
As a result, equal levels of international patenting in different years may reflect different
levels of overall ideas production, since the degree of competition for patents may vary by year.
Further, countries may differ in terms of their propensity-to-patent (perhaps because of legal,
corporate or institutional norms) with the consequence that countries with the same flow of new-
to-the-world ideas may be observed with different international patenting levels.  Finally, patents
granted in any year reflect inventive effort undertaken in prior years, and so we impose a lag of
three years between observed patenting and the variables associated with national ideas
production.  Taken together, our empirical framework must therefore account for heterogeneity
among countries, concavity in global ideas production, and the lag between invention and patent
grants.  To do so, we assume that beyond a country-specific propensity effect, the expected
levels of international patents in year t+3 by a given country will be proportional to its













































λ φ ψ β
λφ ψ β (5)
(5) suggests that, in order to evaluate the relationship between observed levels of
international patenting and the national ideas production function, it will be crucial to account for
both year and country effects.  In other words, after accounting for each of the above issues,  the
structural relationship between international patenting and national ideas production is given by
EP A T S H A A jt j t A t jt jt () ,, , , +−
− = 3 γ θ
λ φ ψ β (6)
Linking (6) to an empirical model requires specifying two additional features of the
model.  First, the realized level of patenting will differ from the predicted value given by (6);  the14
source of this disturbance is assumed to arise from an idiosyncratic country-specific technology
shock each year unrelated to either the level of research effort or the measured stock of ideas.
17
Second, (6) highlights the fact that there is a tradeoff between carefully controlling for the year-
by-year competition for patents at the world level (the year effect, θ t) and measuring the impact
of international spillovers.  Specifically, the coefficient on A-j,t is not separately identified from
individual time effects in a regression specification (note that AA jj + −  is constant across
countries in a given year).   However, the realized level of patenting by all countries grows
slowly and at a relatively constant rate across years; therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume
that the variance due to concavity in the global ideas production function can be captured
through the inclusion of an overall time trend rather than individual year effects.  Under such an
assumption, one can separately identify the impact of international knowledge spillovers, A j − .
This discussion suggests two alternative regression specifications:




Aj t j t jt + =++ + + 3 δ γ λ φ η (7A)
ln ln ln ( ) ,, , , , PATS Y H A A j t YEAR t j
C
Aj t j t j t jt + − =+ + + + − + 3 δ γ λ φ ψ β η (7B)
In (7A), we include specific year effects; without further assumptions, this specification
yields consistent estimates for φ  and λ .  In (7b), we replace the individual year effects with the
single time trend coefficient, allowing for separate identification of ( ) ψ β − .  Consistency of
OLS for (7B) requires us to additionally assume that the country-specific error is not
autocorrelated and that the error is independent of both the country and world stock of ideas.  In
our empirical work, we explore both specifications (and variants), being careful to compare the
results and highlight the differences resulting from different approaches.
V. Measuring the Domestic and “Rest of World” Ideas Stock
To estimate (7), we must measure both the domestic and international stock of ideas, Aj
and A-j, respectively.  We do so by using a dataset composed of international patenting patterns
                                                          
17 After we include a country and year fixed effect, the main sources of endogeneity and serial correlation should be
accounted for.  However, in the empirical work, we specifically check for various forms of autocorrelation and
present several different specifications which allow us to evaluate the potential for certain sources of endogeneity.
As well, all of the standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary heteroskedasticity.15
by 17 OECD countries between 1973-1993.  Two distinct alternatives are available.  In one
approach, we exploit the panel nature of the data and construct relative knowledge stocks by
equating the knowledge stock with the relative contribution of a given country to the worldwide
patent stock (thus we call this the direct approach since the knowledge stock is directly measured
from international patenting patterns).  In our second approach, we invert the aggregate
production function by exploiting the functional relationship between the level of realized total
factor productivity and the knowledge stock of a given country (thus we call this the inversion
approach).
A.  The Direct Approach
In the direct approach,  the country-specific technological stock in year t is equal to a country-
specific effect and the observed accumulation of international patents until t-1









), resulting in the following OLS implementation of (7A):
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The underlying assumption of this model is that the specific knowledge stock upon which
different countries draw when contributing to worldwide ideas is closely connected to their prior
innovative output.  In the current context, after controlling for both the year of observation (thus
accounting for all “common” elements of the knowledge stock across different countries) and
including a country-specific effect (accounting for the baseline knowledge stock prior to the
beginning of the observed sample), this assumption may be a reasonable approximation of the
degree to which countries differ in terms of the knowledge stock they can draw upon,
particularly in the medium-run.  Moreover, this approach can be easily generalized to measure
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B.  The Inversion Approach
The inversion approach is a  second, distinct methodology which exploits the functional


















).   In other words, according to the Romer
model, there is an equivalence in the level of knowledge upon which the country draws upon in
generating ideas and final output; we use this restriction to back out Aj from the variables which
determine total factor productivity.
18  Under such an approach, we are able to derive the
following OLS implementation of (7A):
j,t
YC
j,t 3 t j A j,t .33 .67
L
Y
ln PATS lnH ( / )ln
KH
δγλ φ σ η +

=++ + + 

(9)
It is important to note that, in contrast to the direct approach, (9) cannot separately
identify φ  and σ ; only their ratio is identified.  However, this is of some independent interest.
For example, if σ  < 1, then the estimate provides an upper bound estimate for φ .  In conjunction
with an analysis of how different measures of A affect the level of productivity itself, we are also
able to highlight the potential differences between φ  and σ .  Further, note that it is possible to
unpack the elements of TFP (Y, K , and L) and separately analyze each of their contributions to
international patenting productivity (we make a first pass at exploring these possibilities in the
empirical work).  Finally, note that we do not choose in the current analysis to impose the cross-
equation restrictions implied by joint estimation of the productivity equation and the ideas
equation together (as is done in an alternative model pursued in Eaton and Kortum (1998)).
Instead, we focus on reporting the simplest relationships associated with international patenting,
guided by the Romer model of economic growth which allows us to isolate the underlying
production relationship.
IV. THE DATA
The data consists of a novel dataset of patenting activity and its determinants from 1973
                                                          
18 Following many earlier authors, we impose   . α = 33 and so we do not compute a “first-stage” regression to
determine the relative weights on labor and capital in determining final output.17
through 1993 (Table 1 provides definition and sources, and Table 2 presents summary statistics).
To allow us to estimate the ideas production function in several different ways, the data include
(a) the flow of international patents for each country in each year, (b) measures of the factor
inputs into ideas production, and  (c) aggregate production function variables.  We review the
definition and summary statistics associated with each of the measures now in turn.
Patents.  The principal dependent variable, PATENTSj,t+3 , is the number of U.S. patents
granted to establishments in country j in year (t+3).   In other words, we assume that ideas
production in a given year is reflected in the patents which are granted 3 years in the future.
19
We employ U.S. patents to provide a comparable measure of innovations with substantial
commercial importance across the 17 OECD countries in our sample.  International
establishments obtaining U.S. patent protection for their ideas incur a substantial cost (recent
estimates hover at around $100,000), and this cost is approximately equal for foreign inventors
from different countries (Eaton and Kortum, 1996).
20
The use  of patenting data to measure national ideas production requires some
explanation.  First, the use of PATENTS in no way implies that we believe that international
patents constitute the only relevant innovative outputs of national economies nor an ideal
absolute measure of such outputs; instead, we are assuming that the international patents measure
provides a useful index of overall innovative activity.
21   Second, there are potential differences
                                                          
19 We experimented with other lag structures and found robustness for our principal results for any lag between 2-4
years.  An obvious (but time-consuming) remedy to the (strong) assumption about the lag structure is to gather
patent application data from worldwide priority date (a measure recorded by the Derwent patent statistics) which
would allow us to more specifically match resource expenditures and the timing of invention.
20 The costs of filing a U.S. patent are lower for U.S. inventors perhaps by about half (and the incentives to patent
may be higher); consequently, for most of our analysis, we exclude observations for U.S. inventors.  However, we
do show robustness to the inclusion of the U.S. inventor data and use U.S. inventor data for the purposes of
comparison.  When we do, we use a measure of U.S. patenting which is equal to the number of issued non-
individual U.S. patents (i.e., patents issued to an inventor associated with a corporation, governmental body,
educational or other non-profit institution).
21 As suggested in Eaton and Kortum (1996, 1998), the key assumption is that the value of innovations is distributed
according to a fixed distribution across economies and a constant fraction of innovative output turns out to be
valuable enough to justify an international patent.  To the extent that this fractional value varies across countries or
across time, the framework we developed in Section III derives how to overcome these issues through the use of18
among countries in terms of their industrial composition and their underlying “propensity to
patent.”   Such heterogeneity introduces variance into the regression and potential
mismeasurement of the stock of knowledge.
22  Finally, across the sample, there has been an
increasing number of international patents granted over the last quarter century.  Beyond
reflecting true increases in new-to-the-world ideas production, this increase may reflect
increasing levels of international trade, the increasing strength of intellectual property protection,
or cyclical waves in the realization of important ideas (the so-called “recharge” phenomena).
However, the use of year and trend effects provides a control for these common shifters.
With these caveats in mind, the average number of international patents  produced by a
country in a given year in our sample is 2022 with a standard deviation of 3876.   As can be seen
in Figure 1, there has been a temporal increase in the number of patents issued to foreign
inventors over the past 20 years, reaching a peak in the last year of the sample (which
corresponds to patents issued in 1996).  Figure 2 shows “per-capita” patenting rates (i.e.,
PATENTS /  POPULATION) for different countries over the sample.  Three facts are of
immediate interest.  First, there is substantial heterogeneity among countries in terms of their
realized patenting intensity.  Second, at the beginning of the sample, the only country with a per-
capita patenting rate similar to the United States’ own rate is Switzerland.
23  Third, while the
most dramatic increase in per capita patenting is associated with Japan, convergence towards the
U.S. level is experienced by a substantial number of OECD countries (though countries such as
Italy and the U.K. do not share in this phenomena).  The empirical work explains this
heterogeneity in terms of more structural factors such as the resources devoted to R&D and the
stock of ideas of individual countries.
Factor Inputs for the Ideas Production Function.   We estimate the determinants of
PATENTS using both the direct and inversion approaches.  In both approaches, we estimate the
sensitivity of ideas production to human capital resources devoted to the ideas-producing sector
                                                                                                                                                                                          
fixed year and country effect in the empirical model.
22 In terms of differences in patenting propensity, the most likely candidate for a large difference is Japan.  We have
confirmed that our results are robust to the exclusion of Japan.
23 Recall that the U.S. patenting level is determined by the number of patents issued to U.S. inventors associated
with an institution such as a company, governmental body, or university.19
(i.e., the λ  parameter in the Jones’ variant model).  We measure this input with the number of
full-time equivalent scientists and engineers working in R&D in an economy (FTE S&E),
24
FTE S&E averages over 136,000 in this sample (compare this to a 1996 figure for the United
States of over 3 million), and can be seen to exhibit an upward trend for most countries in the
sample over the twenty-year period under study (Figure 3).    As can be seen in Figure 4, there
exists substantial heterogeneity among countries and over time in terms of underlying
international patenting productivity (PATENTS / FTE S&E), ranging from over .05 patents per
R&D worker for Switzerland during the 1970s to less than .001 patents per R&D workers for
Spain.  However, there is a strong correlation between PATENT and FTE S&E (ρ  = .94).
In the direct approach, we exploit the panel aspect of our data and measure the stock of
knowledge as each individual country’s cumulative patent stock (PATENT STOCK) which is
simply the sum over patents granted for all prior years since 1970 (Mean = 18704).  Controlling
for country fixed effects (accounting for each country’s baseline stock of knowledge) and annual
fixed effects (accounting for the diffusion of knowledge across international borders), changes in
PATENT STOCK reflect the accretion of country-specific knowledge.  It is useful to note that
while the level of PATENT STOCK is increasing by construction for all countries, there is still a
close correlation between PATENT STOCK and PATENT (ρ  = .91).
We extend the ideas production function to separate out the effect of  the within-country
patent stock from international spillovers effects. WORLD PATENT STOCK is the sum of
PATENT STOCK over all countries in each year.  However, as mentioned earlier, the relevant
concept from the view of  country j is that part of the STOCK which has been invented
elsewhere.  As such, our dataset includes the  REST OF WORLD” PATENT STOCK (WORLD
PATENT STOCK – PATENT STOCK).
25  Further, we also calculate more nuanced measures
                                                          
24 Of course, just as PATENT is only a noisy measure of innovative output, FTE S&E represents only an index of
the number of workers in an economy devoted to ideas production.  This measure tends to exclude technical
investment by small firms (venture start-ups, etc.) as well as technical problem-solving which occurs on the “shop
room” floor, yielding key process and product improvements for individual firms as well as entire industries (REF).
In related work, we confront these issues to some extent by breaking down this measure into private, public, and
university sector employment, by using  expenditure-based rather than employment-based measures, and including
alternative measures of the size of the ideas sector (Stern, Porter and Furman, 1999; Porter and Stern, 1999).
25 Note that the WORLD PATENT STOCK includes patents granted to U.S. establishment (though we explore20
which might capture the impact of international spillovers, including the REGIONAL PATENT
STOCK (where only countries in close geographic proximity are included) and the SHARED
LANGUAGE PATENT STOCK (dividing the relevant “pools” into English-speaking, German-
speaking, and other groups).  All of these measures are used to evaluate the role of the absolute
versus relative patent stock position on R&D productivity.  Finally, following the suggestion of
Coe and Helpman (1995), among others, we explore whether the salience of the trading
relationship with the U.S. has an effect on the spillovers associated with international patenting
productivity by including both the level of imports to and exports from the United States.
“Output” Production Function Variables.  To proxy the stock of knowledge with the
determinants of total factor productivity in the inversion approach, we use aggregate output and
factor inputs in our analysis.  These measures include GDP (measured in PPP-adjusted 1985
US$), POPULATION, the labor force employed in the non-ideas producing sector (LABOR),
and the non-residential fixed capital stock as calculated from the Penn World Tables
(CAPITAL).
26
Year and  Country Dummies and Controls.  We introduce year and country controls to
account for potential concavity in global ideas production, differences in patenting propensity,
and to control for potential differences in industrial composition.  Indeed, it is important that we
establish the robustness of our results to the inclusion (or exclusion) of these different controls to
evaluate the potential importance of such heterogeneity.  The empirical analysis includes both
fixed effects (Year and/or Country dummies (Yt and Cj, respectively) as well as coarser controls,
including a YEAR trend variable (ranging from 0 to 20) and a “baseline” per capita productivity
measure, real 1967 GDP (GDP67).
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS:  THE IDEAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION
The empirical argument proceeds in several distinct steps, so it is useful to preview our
overall approach and findings.   We first review the estimates resulting from the direct approach
(Tables 3-6).    This analysis begins with a baseline model which includes year and country-
                                                                                                                                                                                          
variants where we calculate this concept excluding the U.S. data).
26 Except for the adjustment to LABOR to account for FTE S&E,  these measures are traditional aggregate
productivity variables and have been thoroughly examined in many prior studies (Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1991)).21
specific effects, following (7A); our main finding is that there exists a strong, proportional
relationship between PATENTS and PATENT STOCK.  In Tables 4 & 5, we expand the
analysis to include international knowledge pools (following (7B)); our main result is that while
the restriction on the domestic stock is robust, the net impact of international knowledge is
negative in terms of the production of new-to-the-world ideas.  Table 6 explores the possibility
of serial correlation and potential misspecification and endogeneity of the patent stock itself.  In
each of these robustness exercises, we reconfirm our general finding in favor of the Romer
assumption ( φ ≈ 1) and the negative net impact of international spillovers.
We then turn to the Inversion approach (Table 7), where we find a similarly strong relationship
between ideas sector productivity and our estimate of the knowledge stock.   Finally, in Table  8,
we briefly explore how our measures of the knowledge stock contribute to the level of TFP,
providing evidence about the sensitivity of economywide productivity to the flow of knowledge
from the ideas sector of the economy.   We find a small but significant impact, suggesting that
ideas-driven growth may be a feasible but empirically modest effect.
A. Evidence from the Direct Approach
Table 3 presents several models closely connected to the single-country models of
Romer (1990) and Jones (1995), namely, a simple log-log regression of the flow of patents on
the amount of labor employed in the ideas-producing sector, a measure of the stock of
knowledge, and controls for year and country.  The results are striking.   The baseline
specification (3-1) includes fixed effects both for each country in the sample as well as for each
year.
27  While the returns to research effort are declining in its level ( . λ = 48), the estimated
sensitivity to increases in the patent stock is greater than 1 ( . φ = 119 in the baseline).  Indeed, we
can reject H0 1 : φ < .
28  These parameters cannot reject the presence of an important
precondition for ideas-driven growth, namely, the existence of a positive, proportional feedback
between the flow and stock of ideas production.   In model (3-3), we go to the other extreme in
terms of controlling for heterogeneity across years and countries by including only a baseline
                                                          
27 See Section IV for further discussion of the development of this specification.
28 Similar results are found in (3-2), which includes the data for patents granted to U.S. establishments.22
year dummy (Y73), a YEAR trend and a baseline country proxy, L GDP67.  While there is a
substantial decline in the estimated sensitivity to PATENT STOCK, the parameter is still greater
than .8 and precisely estimated (  λ  declines (but not significantly) to .39).  The reduction in the
estimate of φ  depends on the inclusion of country-specific effects.  In other words, evidence in
favor of the Romer hypothesis is even stronger when one only relies on the time-series
dimension in this data.   Rather than simply being the result of differences across countries in
terms of their “propensity-to-patent,” international patenting productivity is driven by changes
over time in the stock of patents accumulated within individual countries.  A further striking
result is that, even with only five regressors, nearly all of the variance in PATENTS is explained
(R
2 = .98).
In (3-3), we see that there is a strong downward evolution of patenting productivity
(estimated at the rate of 8% per year).  Along with the strong positive impact of the PATENT
STOCK (which increases over time), this result suggests that time-series variation in R&D
productivity is a “tug-of-war” between the positive impact of each country’s PATENT STOCK
and an overall negative effect resulting from the passage of time.  Table 4 unpacks this dilemma
more precisely and, in so doing, highlights the role of international knowledge spillovers.   In (4-
1), we exclude all controls for year (excluding both the year effects and the time trend) and find
no dependence between PATENT and PATENT STOCK.
29  This negative result confirms that
the productivity of a given stock of ideas in producing new-to-the-world ideas depends critically
on the height of the global innovation “bar.”  This intuition is strengthened in the final two
columns of Table 4 which follow the specification suggested in (7B) and include the REST OF
WORLD PATENT STOCK in the regression.  In both specifications,  . φ > 9 and, perhaps as
importantly, our estimate of   [] 1 ψβ −< − .  This latter estimate suggests that either (a) the
international knowledge spillovers have either a modest positive or even negative effect and/or
(b) there exists a substantial “raising the bar” effect by which increases in the number of ideas
discovered worldwide substantially decreases the ability of a country to produce new-to-the-
world technologies.  Indeed, after including REST OF WORLD PATENT STOCK, the
measured effect of the YEAR trend is in fact positive and the level of international patenting is
                                                          
29 As well, there is a substantial increase in the size of the coefficient on FT S&E.23
substantially concave in the size of the R&D workforce.
We extend this analysis of spillovers in Table 5.  In each of the first two columns, we
group all of the countries according to a regional or language affiliation (Table 1 lists these
groupings).  For each country, we calculate the PATENT STOCK for the remaining countries in
the group.   We then examine the sensitivity of the flow of international patents to each of these
measures using (4-3) as a baseline regression.  There is no measured dependence between the
REGIONAL or SHARED LANGUAGE PATENT STOCK and the flow of international patents
from any given country.  However, even including each of these measures, the sensitivity to the
domestic PATENT STOCK remains high (estimated at .85 and .94 respectively).  Finally, in
(5-3), we examine the potential spillovers between each country and the United States (as the
United States is the destination patenting country).  While our core results remain similar
( . φ = 89), we additionally find that countries with high levels of exports to the United States tend
to register a higher flow of international patents and that countries who import heavily from the
United States tend to have lower rates of international patenting.   This result provides support
for prior research which has highlighted international trade as the key mechanism through which
international knowledge spillovers occur (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Eaton and Kortum, 1996;
Keller, 1997).
The results from Tables 4 and 5 potentially illuminate an important difference between
domestic and international spillovers.  Specifically, accumulation of knowledge at the world
level may not have the same effect on the marginal productivity of R&D as knowledge
accumulation at the national level.  According to these regressions, higher rates of ideas
production in other countries imposes a net negative externality on a given country’s ideas sector
in terms of the production of new-to-the-world technologies.  As other countries extend the
frontier of realized technologies, it becomes more costly for any given country to further extend
that frontier (the “raising the bar” effect).   Moreover, this raising the bar effect is not swamped
by an international “standing on shoulders” effect.  Indeed, even when controlling for this overall
effect, there are only modest measured “regional” or “language-based” spillovers.  Despite the
low levels of these international spillovers, individual countries seem to be able to benefit from
their own form of standing on shoulders, as suggested by the consistently high parameters
associated with φ .   Another way of interpreting these results is that as other countries make24
new discoveries, individual countries must spend an increasing share of their R&D resources on
absorbing and imitating these ideas.  The consequence of substitution towards imitative activity
is that the production of new-to-the-world ideas by the R&D sector is declining in the number of
ideas produced externally.
The analysis so far has focused on characterizing, in a simple way, the drivers of ideas
sector productivity as reflected in the production of international patents.  As discussed in
Section IV, the inclusion of fixed year and country effects (or other appropriate controls) yields a
specification which is consistent under OLS (though we do account for heteroskedasticity when
computing the standard errors).  Of course, it is possible that additional serial correlation (above
and beyond that which is controlled for by the fixed effects) is spuriously driving the above
results.  Consequently, Table 6A specifically presents our results correcting for the simplest form
of serial correlation (AR(1)).
30  The results are remarkably similar to our earlier estimates; while
there is a slight increase in the variance, all of the coefficient are essentially the same or shift in a
direction which provides further support for our earlier results.
As well, in Table 6B, we attempt to address several issues which arise in the construction
of the PATENT STOCK itself.   First, we check whether our results are sensitive to spurious
patterns based on a few years of data early in the sample.  In (6B-1), we show that the results are
essentially unchanged even if observations are drawn only from years after 1980 (of course, the
PATENT STOCK variable is still calculated from the 1970 data onwards).  In (6B-2) and (6B-3),
we extend the analysis to account for the depreciation in PATENT STOCK.  In (6B-2), we
impose a 20% depreciation rate on the PATENT STOCK.  Perhaps surprisingly, the results
                                                          
30 We only present results for the AR(1) correction; however, we experimented extensively with alternative error
structures (specifically higher-order AR) and found no change in our results.   Further, we examined whether the
PATENT STOCK and the year and country fixed effects are conintegrated.  While we cannot reject panel
cointegration for our sample (Pedroni, 1999), preliminary analysis using exisiting panel cointegration methods did
not substantially impact our results (the standard errors increased modestly but in no way impacted our hypothesis
tests).  However, because PATENT STOCK is calculated as the summation of prior realizations of the dependent
variable (and so is not simply the lagged immediate value of the dependent variable), existing panel cointegration
techniques (such as Kao and Chiang (1997)  and Pedroni (1996)) do not provide the precise correction necessary for
our application.  As such, we report OLS (and AR1) standard errors, leaving the derivation of the appropriate
cointegration adjustment for an “increasing returns” heterogeneous panel data model for future research.25
continue to be robust, though the absolute value of the coefficient on REST OF WORLD
PATENT STOCK  substantially decreases.  In (6B-3), we specifically compare the sensitivity to
newer and older patenting by specifically including lagged PATENTS.  To guard against pure
autocorrelation, we instrument lagged PATENTS with the lagged PATENT STOCK and FTE
S&E.  We find that both PATENT STOCK and PATENTS(T-1) are significant, of roughly equal
size, and the sum of these coefficients is over .9, providing additional support for our claim that
the estimated parameter on intertemporal spillovers is approximately unity.
Taken together, this evidence points to a novel and intriguing possibility, namely, that
while there is strong evidence for positive local knowledge spillovers, advances in the
international knowledge frontier may reduce the flow of frontier ideas by a given country.  It is
difficult for technological laggards to “leapfrog” over the technological stock of other nations
and produce at the world frontier.
31   For all countries, a substantial amount of technical effort is
devoted towards imitative or absorptive activity rather than the production of new-to-the-world
technologies.
B. Evidence from the Inversion Approach
We now explore a second avenue for evidence through the inversion approach.
As mentioned earlier, exploiting inversion requires making a (relatively) strong assumption
about the dependency between current output and patent flows; the errors in the output equation
cannot be correlated with the error in the patent equation.   While the validity of this assumption
is debatable (though including country and year-specific effects may make this assumption more
plausible), the inversion method does allow for a simple evaluation of the relationship between
productivity in the output and the ideas sectors.  The first model presented in Table 7 employs a
population-based specification for aggregate output (GDP A POP jt jt jt ,, , =
σ β ),
32 yielding the simple
empirical specification,
L PATENTS Y C L FTES E L GDP L POP jt t j jt jt jt ,, , , &/ / =++ + − λ φ σ βφ σ (10)
                                                          
31 We recognize that such effects are predicted by certain growth models but not others (compare the quality ladder
model of Grossman and Helpman (1991) which explicitly includes a raising the bar effect) with Rivera-Batiz and
Romer (1991) which essentially assumes that integration involves strong positive R&D productivity spillovers.
32 While it will be separately estimated, one could imagine setting β =1.26
As noted earlier, we cannot separately identify the structural parameters φ  or σ  but only
their ratio (i.e., the returns of ideas-to-ideas versus the return of ideas-to-output).   In (7-1), we
examine this simple model, and find that both λ  and φ /σ  are estimated to be relatively high.
Indeed, one cannot reject H0 1 : / φ σ < .  In (7-2), we examine this relationship in a more
structural fashion in (7-2), replacing the population-based measure with the level of TFP (setting
 . α = 33).  While λ  remains just above .5, the TFP parameter is estimated to be quite low (φ /σ  =
.13)   However, we are able to demonstrate (in (7-3)) that this finding results from the separate
positive contribution of the level of the CAPITAL STOCK to ideas production at a given point in
time (recall that we impose country-specific dummies).  While the role of capital in the
productivity of ideas production is not discussed in the theoretical literature (at least to our
knowledge), comparing (7-2) and (7-3) suggests its importance:  R&D productivity at the
country level is positively (and separately) related to both TFP and the economywide capital
stock.   Indeed, this should not be so surprising:  the ideas sector is in fact heavily capital-
intensive and relies on the availability of advanced capital equipment and scientific instruments
(Rosenberg, 1994).
Together, both the inversion and direct approaches provide consistent evidence.  First, the
domestic ideas stock is a key determinant of a country’s production of new-to-the-world
technologies.  Moreover, this positive domestic spillover seems relatively independent of the
impact of knowledge from abroad. The evidence suggests instead that international knowledge
has a net negative impact on the flow of new-to-the-world technologies.  Moreover, this effect is
strongest for “distant” international knowledge.  This suggests that rather than assuming that all
countries somehow share a common knowledge stock (or that more advanced countries’
knowledge pools are strict supersets of poorer countries knowledge stocks), countries may have
very heterogeneous and only partially matched knowledge stocks.  The specific industrial and
technological focus of individual countries (or regions) yields domestic knowledge pools which
are substantially differentiated from the rest of the world (Porter, 1990; Nelson, 1993; Stern,
Furman, and Porter, 1999).27
VII.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS: IDEAS PRODUCTION & AGGREGATE
OUTPUT/GROWTH
Finally, in Table 8, we attempt to reconcile the evidence for Romer’s model for ideas
with the poor predictive power of that model in explaining aggregate productivity growth (this
evidence has been reviewed by, among other, Jones (1995)).  To do so, we explore how the level
of GDP or TFP is affected by the PATENT STOCK measure.  Our main conclusion from Table
8 is that there seems to be a small (but significant) effect of the PATENT STOCK on the level of
TFP.  Our analysis begins in (8-1) with a regression which includes both year and country
effects; just relying on the relative growth of the PATENT STOCK, we find that TFP is
predicted to grow only 22% in response to a doubling of the PATENT STOCK.  In the remaining
regressions, an even weaker link is found.  In (8-2) and (8-3), we explore the productivity boost
from the PATENT STOCK given the level of LABOR and CAPITAL.  While the coefficient on
PATENT STOCK remains significant, its size is substantially reduced; in (8-3), a doubling of the
patent stock is associated with only a 5% increase in the level of TFP.  Finally, we are not able to
separately identify the impact of the domestic and international patent stock on TFP (the results
are noisy though consistent with our earlier findings).
Together with the previous section, these results provide some guidance about the
feasibility and significance of ideas-driven growth.  While the critical production parameter for
ideas-driven growth is the proportional feedback between current and historical ideas production





λ ).   Our results suggest that ideas-driven growth may be feasible; however, the size
of such effects may be modest.   Several effects intervene between ideas production and realized
productivity growth:  the concavity in research effort and the weak sensitivity of productivity to
ideas production.
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides evidence for three principal findings.  First, as we have emphasized
repeatedly, the evidence on international patenting provides support for the strong positive28
feedbacks in ideas production at the national level proposed by Romer.  However, this support
for the Romer model is balanced by our additional findings which shed light on the difficulties in
using an ideas-driven growth model to explain realized productivity growth.  Specifically, the
local nature of knowledge spillovers (at least in the medium run) along with the inability to
translate new-to-the-world ideas production into TFP weakens the measured empirical
significance of the Romer model.
One of the most surprising findings from our analysis is the sharp disjunction between the
strong positive relationship between ideas productivity and the national ideas stock and the
strong negative relationship with foreign knowledge sources.  This finding provides support for
one of two complementary interpretations:  either foreign patenting substantially “raises the bar”
for future international patenting or international knowledge spillovers for ideas production are
relatively weak.  Both of these interpretations are consistent with recent work, at the industry or
national level, which has emphasized the important role played by the national (or even regional)
environment in understanding the dynamics of the innovative process (Porter, 1990; Nelson,
1993).  While our results do not contradict earlier evidence that the aggregate economy benefits
from the absorption and imitation of foreign technologies (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Park, 1995), the evidence highlights that the
capacity for new-to-the-world innovation seems to be a country-specific asset.
It is possible that more far-reaching factors are at work in explaining the weak
relationship between ideas sector productivity and TFP.  The results highlight that realizing the
full social benefits from new technologies depends on the diffusion of these new technologies
into the productive sector of the economy and the ability to the productive sector to take best
advantage of technical advance.  However, there is good reason to believe that diffusion may be
both slow and incomplete, even for technologies which are capable of being patented and
presumably have at least some commercial value.  In most OECD countries, the scientific and
engineering communities represent a relatively small part of the overall economy and the
linkages among members of technical community tend to be strong relative to linkages between
this community and the productive side of the economy.  As a result, it should not be very
surprising if the productive sector of the economy does not exploit the full range of innovations
being developed by the ideas sector.  Indeed, the incentives provided to scientists and engineers29
may in fact explicitly discourage the development of linkages with the full range of downstream
commercial application sectors (Stern,1999).
Moreover, the full translation of ideas and new technologies into productive output
depends on many intervening factors including the technical and human capital of the workforce,
whether the economy’s physical and information infrastructure are positioned to take advantage
of new technologies, and whether the industrial organization of adopting sectors is conducive to
taking advantage of technology development (e.g., consumers who are willing to experiment
with new technologies, the existence of micro-market incentives to commercialize new
technologies, and supply relationships which complement and reinforce the social value of novel
technologies (Porter, 1990)).  While most earlier work has simply assumed the existence of a
downstream production sector which is both perfectly competitive and whose physical and
human capital is compatible with new technologies, it may be the case that the substantial
investments and adjustments which are involved in applying new technologies substantially
undercuts the ability of the ideas sector and new technologies to contribute directly to TFP
growth in the medium-term (Rosenberg, 1976; David, 1990).  In related work, we specifically
explore the relationship between the microeconomic foundations of R&D investment and the
national capacity for innovation more fully (Stern, Porter, and Furman (1999)).   In the spirit of
this work, identifying the specific mechanisms by which linkages among the ideas and
production sectors of the economy lead to higher rates of diffusion and what factors limit the
applicability of new technologies to generating productivity gains seems an extremely promising
area for further theoretical and empirical research.30
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PATENTSj,t Patents granted in the US to establishments in
country y in year (t+3)
CHI US patent database
IDEAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION INPUTS
FT S&Ej,t Full Time Equivalent Scientists & Engineers in all
sectors in country j in year t















WORLD PATENT STOCKt  -PATENT STOCK
“REGIONAL” PATENT
STOCK
Analogous to “REST OF WORLD” PATENT STOCK summed over regions:
* Australia, New Zealand
* Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland
* Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
* Canada, United States
* Japan and  UK are ungrouped
“SHARED LANGUAGE”
PATENT STOCK
Analogous to “REST OF WORLD” PATENT STOCK over common language
base:
* Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, United States
* Austria, Germany, Switzerland
* All other countries are ungrouped
IMPORTSj,t Real PPP-Adjusted Imports from country j to US
in year t in 1985 US B $
OECD
EXPORTSj,t Real PPP-Adjusted Exports from US to country j
in year t in 1985 US B$
OECD
AGGREGATE PRODUCTION FUNCTION VARIABLES
GDPj,t Real PPP-Adjusted GDP in 1985 US B $ in
country j in year t
Penn World Tables
POPULATIONj,t Population in millions in country j in year t Penn World Tables
LABORj,t FULL-TIME EMPLOYED LABOR FORCE -
FTE S&E
Penn World Tables;







TIME & COUNTRY VARIABLES
YEAR (1972 = Year 0) (Year - 1972)
* The natural logarithm of a variable, X, will be denoted L X.TABLE 2
MEANS & STANDARD DEVIATIONS




PATENTS PER CAPITA 55.45 48.23
IDEAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION INPUTS
FT S&E 136715.30 188095.30
PATENT STOCK 18704.41 37909.60
PATENT STOCK PER CAPITA 553.37 643.08
SPILLOVER MEASURES
WORLD PATENT STOCK 646282.00 392388.00












* Summary statistics exclude US observations.TABLE 3
IDEAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION:
DIRECT APPROACH






























Year Dummies (20) Sig. Sig.
Country Dummies (16) Sig. Sig.
Regression Statistics
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.98
# of Observations 330.00 351.00 330.00TABLE 4
INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS &
R&D PRODUCTIVITY OVER TIME
Dependent Variable = Ln(Patents)
(4-1) (4-2) (4-3)



































Country Dummies (16) Sig. Sig.
Regression Statistics
R-squared 0.98 0.99 0.98
# of Observations 330.00 330.00 330.00TABLE 5
REGIONAL, LANGUAGE &
TRADE-RELATED SPILLOVERS
Dependent Variable = Ln(Patents)
(5-1) (5-2) (5-3)
(4-3) including
L “Rest of Region”
Patent Stock
(4-3) including




L Imports & L
Exports
Ideas Inputs




















L EXPORTS TO U.S. 0.11
(0.03)
L IMPORTS FROM U.S. -0.11
(0.02)




























R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.99
# of Observations 330.00 330.00 330.00TABLE 6A
EXPLORING SERIAL CORRELATION






































Year Dummies (20) Sig.
Country Dummies (16) Sig. Sig.
Regression Statistics
# of Observations 330.00 330.00 330.00TABLE 6B
EXPLORING THE CALCULATION OF THE PATENT STOCK
Dependent Variable = Ln(Patents)
(6-1) (6-2) (6-3)

















L PATENTS (T-1) 0.45
(0.06)





L PATENT STOCK  (k)
0.86
(0.02)





























# of Observations 224.00 287.00 300.00











L GDP (k/c) 1.09
(0.20)
L POP (- k/c) -1.65
(0.09)













Year Dummies (20) Sig. Sig.
Country Dummies (16) Sig. Sig.
Regressions Statistics
R-squared 0.93 0.99 0.99
# of Observations 330.00 271.00 271.00TABLE 8
SENSITIVITY OF AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY
TO IDEAS PRODUCTION
(8-1) (8-2) (8-3) (8-4)
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
L GDP L GDP L TFP L TFP
















Aggregate Production Function Inputs
L POPULATION 0.38
(0.10)
L LABOR (1 - ?) 0.59
(0.04)
L CAPITAL ( ?) 0.28
(0.05)













Year Dummies (20) Sig.
Country Dummies (16) Sig.
Regressions Statistics
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.13 0.13
# of Observations 288.00 271.00 271.00 271.00